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Evaluating the Risks
of Increased Price Transparency
BY

MAURICE

E.

STUCKE

Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,7 these firms might set
their prices at "a profit-maximizing, supracompetitive level by
recognizing their shared economic interests and their interdependence with respect to price and output decisions." For
example, with the advent of the Internet, competitors may
respond quicker than customers to price discounts and adjust
prices downward to prevent any loss of customers. Such rapid
dissemination of pricing information to the marketplace may
chill future discounting and foster supracompetitive pricing.8 But even if prices are significantly above the competitors' marginal costs, then what? This supracompetitive pricing, as some courts expressed, may be undesirable.' Perhaps,
in some circumstances, it may be prevented through effective
enforcement under Section 7 of the Clayton Act."0 But supracompetitive pricing, absent an agreement, does not violate
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
A second difficulty is the question of the appropriate remedy. If the competitors unilaterally determine their own prices
and have not taken any additional steps among themselves to
foster this supracompetitive pricing then, even if the court
could find a violation, there is little it can do, other than regulate pricing. And courts, as the Ninth Circuit warned in
Petroleum Products, "generally are unsuited to act as ratesetting commissions." 1 The courts simply are ill-equipped to
serve as traffic cops directing competitors' unilateral behavior. Ultimately, neither the courts nor antitrust enforcers can
eliminate such coordinated interaction.
But if the competitors take additional observable steps to
facilitate this supracompetitive price (such as exchanging
competitively sensitive information), and if these steps lack
a legitimate procompetitive justification, then the court may
have a workable remedy.12 By targeting these facilitating
practices, such as the exchange of competitively sensitive
information, courts may make such tacit coordination more
difficult to achieve. The courts can deem the information
exchange a "plus" factor if plaintiff alleges a per se illegal
agreement to fix prices; alternatively, the plaintiff can allege,
and the court may consequently find, that any agreement
among competitors to exchange information, by itself, is
anticompetitive under Section l's rule of reason standard. 3
Given the pro- and anticompetitive aspects of increased
price transparency, however, a third difficult issue for the
courts is determining when, and under what circumstances,

COURTS
continue to grapple with the issue of when
increased price transparency is good or bad for
consumers. 1 On the one hand, the model of perAND ANTITRUST
ENFORCERS
assumes that buyers
will have
fect competition
product
characteristics,
and
full information on prices and
the model equilibrium predicts uniform and competitive
prices for comparable goods. With the Internet, greater price
transparency may reduce the buyers' search costs in finding
the best deal, whether it be on airline tickets, bunk beds or
rock climbing gear. It may reduce the sellers' ability to price
discriminate. Consequently, courts may be reluctant to
restrict this free flow of information in the marketplace. Its
dissemination, observed the Supreme Court, "is normally
an aid to commerce" 2 and "can in certain circumstances
increase economic efficiency and render markets more, rather
than less, competitive." 3 Indeed, concerted action to reduce
price transparency may itself be an antitrust violation.4
On the other hand, in more concentrated markets, information exchanges and increased price transparency can have
anticompetitive effects. Competitors may announce their
intentions with respect to future prices (such as signaling a
price increase or announcing that they will discontinue discounts, and charge only the publicly posted list price).
Customers would thus know what they and others will pay
for that product. But competitors through these communications may accomplish two things: first, reduce the uncertainty in negotiating a supracompetitive price and second,
secure effective means to police and punish any cheating.
To confuse matters, the state of the law on this issue, as the
Second Circuit recognized in Todd v. Exxon Corp.,5 was not
always so clear. Nor is it clearer today, given several difficult
issues. The first issue for the courts is distinguishing between
unilateral conduct and collusion. Courts generally recognize
that in an oligopoly, each firm may set its price based partly
on strategic considerations regarding its competitors' behavior.6 As a result, noted the Court in Brooke Group Ltd. v.
Maurice E. Stucke is an attorney at the Antitrust Division of the U.S.
Department of Justice. The views expressed in this article are the
author's own and do not purport to reflect those of the U.S. Department
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the exchange of pricing or other competitively sensitive information should raise antitrust concerns. Under either a "plus"
factor or rule of reason analysis, courts generally appear more
sensitive to:
" The exchange of information among competitors pursuant to an agreement, rather than unilateral activity,
" Private communications among competitors of nonpublic pricing information, rather than the public dissemination of general pricing information,
* The exchange of detailed information regarding current
or future prices or output, rather than of older, aggregated price and supply data, and
* The exchange of information among oligopolists rather
14
than in unconcentrated industries.
But these distinctions do not always hold true. Some
courts, as the dissent noted in Blomkest Fertilizer,Inc. v.
Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, Inc., would appear to permit
private communications between competitors regarding the
verification of prices, which may have no redeeming value in
informing customers and little purpose other than facilitating price coordination.15 Other courts, as in United States v.
Container Corp. ofAmerica,"6 would not. The announcement
of future prices in a concentrated industry was legal in E.I
du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC,17 but challenged in United
States v. Airline TariffPublishingCo. 8 Some courts focus on
whether the competitors' employees who discussed the commercially sensitive information were lower- or upper-level
officials. 9 Others question or ignore such distinctions.2"
Consequently, how does counsel advise a client of the
antitrust risks, both generally and specifically, relating to
these practices?

Which Risk Category Applies
In assessing the antitrust risks of information exchanges, it is
helpful to focus on two points: first, what is the information's
value in promoting efficiency in the marketplace and, in particular, what are the benefits to the firm's and its competitor's
consumers; and second, what is the likelihood that disseminating the information would facilitate tacit collusion. Using
these two points, three categories of antitrust risks emerge
from the case law: green light (low risk); red light (high risk);
and yellow light (medium risk).
1. Green Light: If the information will likely promote efficiency in the marketplace, is valuable to customers, and is
unlikely to facilitate tacit collusion with the company's competitors, then its public dissemination is unlikely to be anticompetitive.
This green-light scenario occurs when the affected marketplace is not susceptible to tacit collusion because of any of
the following factors: many competitors, low entry barriers,
or other factors (such as the affected products' or services' heterogeneous grades, quality, features, or designs) that make
agreeing to and policing any supracompetitive price very difficult. 21 If any of these factors are present, there is less risk that
increasing price transparency would facilitate collusion. In

short, the competitors may have the commercially sensitive
information, but so what? If one competitor unilaterally signals a supracompetitive price increase, it is unlikely, for various market dynamics, that others would follow. Even if they
did follow, easy entry-aided by the increased price transparency-may reinvigorate competition and defeat any
supracompetitive price increase.
Another reason for the low antitrust risk is that, without
transparency, where there are many sellers, buyers may
have high search costs to identify the lowest-priced seller.
Increased price transparency thus may make it easier for
buyers to compare prices and bargain shop, reducing their
search costs. It may reduce price dispersion, without necessarily increasing the product's average retail price. Increased
transparency may also promote efficiency in the sellers' market, for example, by informing sellers on decisions to increase
2
capacity. 1
It is important to note, however, that low or moderately
concentrated industries, as measured under Section 1.51 of
the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 24 do not automatically
immunize all information exchanges. As discussed below, if
competitors exchange information directly among themselves or pursuant to some agreement, then the courts have
not ruled out antitrust liability.25 Moreover, even in this
green-light category, plaintiff retains its trump card of establishing anticompetitive effects from specific forms of information exchanges.
2. Red Light If the information is not provided or valuable to the company's and its competitors' customers, or is
not likely to promote overall efficiency and is likely to (or in
fact did) promote tacit collusion, then its dissemination,
while not per se illegal, carries a high risk of being deemed
anticompetitive.
One such example is where the information sharing is
asymmetric-tilting largely or entirely toward the competitors. Why would competitors share a future price increase
among themselves exclusively (or before announcing it publicly)? One possibility is to avoid the risk of losing customers
as they negotiate through successive communications about
how much to increase prices (or to decrease them, to threaten discounters). Moreover, by voluntarily sharing detailed
transactional information with each other, the competitors
can effectively police the price increase and detect any
cheating.
The customers, on the other hand, stand little, if anything,
to gain by this increased price transparency among competitors. They are still largely in the dark about the future price
increase (and thus cannot effectively adjust their purchases)
or the prices that others have paid (and thus cannot leverage
a better price with this information). It is questionable then
how the marketplace is rendered more efficient and compet26
itive by such asymmetric exchanges.
Todd v. Exxon illustrates the risks of such asymmetric
exchanges. There, according to the plaintiff's complaint, the
fourteen major companies in the integrated oil and petro-

chemical industry regularly met and shared detailed information regarding the compensation paid to their nonunion
managerial, professional, and technical employees.2 7 The
defendants allegedly used this information in setting these
employees' salaries at artificially low levels. The district court
granted the motion to dismiss, and the Second Circuit
reversed.
The Second Circuit began its analysis by examining
28
whether the defendants' market was conducive to collusion.
After concluding that it was, the court observed that the
price transparency was biased almost entirely to the defendants, with no discernible benefit to the affected managers.29
This was not a case, as is discussed below in the yellow-light
section, where the salary and bonus information was sufficiently aggregated and then posted on the Internet for all
prospective and current managers to peruse. Publicly disseminating such aggregated information, noted the Second
Circuit, could have mitigated the anticompetitive effects (if
any), enhanced market efficiency, and lessened the antitrust
risks to the defendant companies.
A second red light scenario involves commercially sensitive
information that, although publicly available, is of little or no
value to customers but is very helpful in enabling the competitors to arrive at a supracompetitive price. As an example,
in Petroleum Products,the defendant oil companies publicly
announced, at times in advance of the effective date, the discounts (or decisions to withdraw discounts) to their franchisee gasoline stations.3 0 The public dissemination of the discount information was of little value to the defendants'
franchisees or the end consumer. The franchisees could not
shop around for the best oil prices: they could only purchase
from their franchisor. Nor did the consumers care what the
gas station paid for the gasoline. They cared only about the
retail price. The purpose and effect then of publicly announcing changes in discounts to the franchisees were, as several
defendants' executives admitted, to quickly inform their competitors of the price change, in the express hope that these
competitors would follow the move and restore their prices.
Without such transparency, the other defendants might not
have readily detected one defendant's withdrawal of its discount and followed accordingly, because the individual
branded gas stations' retail prices varied considerably.31
A third red light scenario is where the actions generally
make little economic sense apart from facilitating collusion.
For example, the competitors may announce to the public
their intentions to abide strictly by their published list prices
and refrain from discounting. Of course, they can continue
to cheat. But if the competitors mutually agree to impose on
themselves some mechanism through which this policy is
verifiable (such as disclosing on their Internet sites detailed
transactional information so that each competitor can readily detect any cheating by the others), then how do the consumers benefit? They may have a psychic benefit knowing
that no one else is getting a better deal. But they, in turn, may
be deprived of a better deal.

Confessing price cutting when one need not do so makes
economic sense in the context of a cartel policing against
price cutting, as two cases illustrate. In Sugar Institute, the
competitors, through the Institute, agreed to sell their refined
sugar only on the prices, terms, and conditions that they
announced in advance of the sale.3 2 The key feature that
troubled the Court was not the announcements of future
prices, but the competitors' voluntary imposition of adherence, without deviation, to these publicly announced future
terms, conditions, and prices. The purpose of this increased
price transparency was to facilitate coordination in the face
of excess capacity-namely, as defendants admitted, the abolition of "vicious and discriminatory system of secret concessions.""
Similarly, in United States v. General Electric Co.,34 the
competitors' attempt to facilitate coordination and reduce
incentives to cheat, without any offsetting consumer benefits,
resulted in more antitrust trouble. In 1962, GE along with
two other companies pleaded guilty to fixing the prices of turbine generators. Pursuant to the United States's parallel civil
action, they entered into a decree, which in part enjoined
them from communicating pricing information to one
another until after this information has been released generally to the trade. Prices declined for several years as defendants
discounted off the list prices.3
To halt this decline, GE, the market leader, published its
pricing books, formulas, and multipliers for these complex
and customized products, provided examples of how it would
calculate its bid price, and published its outstanding orders
and its price quotations. GE also announced its intention not
to discount, and its price protection clause-if it lowered its
price for a particular customer, then it would also give the
identical discount to any buyer within the past six months
upon request. This assured GE's competitor that it would not
give its customers secret discounts without incurring a substantial penalty. Westinghouse quickly matched GE's new
pricing policies, and thereafter GE's and Westinghouse's pricing in the sale of turbine-generators for fossil fuel power
plants was the same, with little or no discounting or negotiations. 6
Unlike Sugar Institute, the Antitrust Division had no direct
evidence of an agreement between the defendants to abide by
the published prices, or any evidence of covert or direct communications between the defendants. What distinguished
this case from conscious parallelism, noted the Division, was
that these proactive steps made little economic sense apart
from facilitating collusion, which, as the defendants' internal
37
documents revealed, was their aim.
3. Yellow Light If the commercially sensitive information
is valuable to the customers and may promote efficiencies in
the marketplace but may also facilitate tacit collusion, then
its dissemination entails both pro- and anticompetitive elements.
This by far is the most difficult line to draw. Ultimately,
the antitrust risk will depend on whether the information
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exchange and price transparency tilt more to the customers'
or competitors' advantage. The more the price transparency
is supported by valid (procompetitive) business justifications,
the lower the risk. In balancing these benefits and risks and
determining the potential antitrust liability, counsel should
consider the following five questions.
Why Is the Client/Competitor Providing this Information? The antitrust risks are lessened to the extent the client's
customers request or rely upon this commercially sensitive
information, the information is narrowly tailored for that
purpose, and no comparable and less harmful alternatives
exist. Conversely, the antitrust risks increase to the extent the
communications are intended more for the client's competitors to assist them in tacitly colluding.
One example of potentially risky behavior is what economists label "cheap talk," namely, communications that do not
commit competitors "to a course of action-for example,
announcing a future price increase, but leaving open the
option to rescind or revise it before it takes effect."3 8 A price
leader risks losing customers by initiating a price increase
without its competitors following. By making a future price
increase non-binding, the price leader can test whether its
rivals will follow. If they do, the price increase can go into
effect. If not, the price leader can rescind the price increase,
generally with little risk of lost business. If the new price is
dependent on multiple factors (such as a competitor's raising
its price in another market), then each competitor must be
able to signal to the others its intentions with respect to each
parameter. This cheap talk-through successive communications-can facilitate the competitors' reaching a supracompetitive price, generally with little risk of lost sales to one
another.
But announcements of future nonbinding price increases are not inherently anticompetitive, particularly where
they are sufficiently valuable to buyers in their financial and
purchase planning. In Ethyl, the price leader at times rescinded or modified the announced price increase if its competitors did not follow. 9 Moreover, the Commission concluded
that the industry was noncompetitive, with highly uniform
pricing (and price changes), limited discounting, stable market shares, and rising prices (in excess of marginal cost),
despite excess capacity and sluggish demand. The Second
Circuit, however, in vacating the FTC's order limiting these
announcements, found that this practice of announcing
price increases in advance of their effective date was valuable
to the defendants' buyers in their financial and purchase
planning. Moreover, it did not appear pretextual: one of the
defendants initiated this practice when it was the sole producer, well before the other competitors entered the industry. If the defendants had been unable to come forward with
an independent business justification for their adoption of
these practices, the court would have been more receptive to
the Commission's argument.4"
Similarly in Reserve Supply Corp. v. Owens-CorningFiberglas Corp., the court did not condemn the defendants' prac-

tice of announcing price increases for their insulation thirty
to sixty days before the price's effective date.41 Many of the
defendants' customers (including the plaintiff) required
advance notice of any price increase. They either would resell
the insulation to other customers, or bid on building contracts well in advance of construction. Thus, this lead time
served an important purpose in the industry. Moreover, the
widespread use of discounts in this industry, noted the court,
would make this an awkward facilitator of tacit collusion.
On the other hand, if cheap talk is combined with activities that are geared primarily toward facilitating tacit collusion and that provide information that is unreliable, misleading, or not useful for the customers, then it carries
greater antitrust risks. For example, in the Airline Tariff
Publishingcase, the United States alleged that the defendant

One example of potentially risky behavior is
what economists label "cheap talk," namely,
communications that do not commit competitors
"to a course of action . . . "

airlines used their computerized fare dissemination services
to freely negotiate among themselves supracompetitive fares
in multiple markets.42 No one questioned that the defendants' computerized fare dissemination system had a procompetitive purpose in supplying travel agents with basic
information about the airline fares for specific routes. But
the antitrust risks arose when the defendant airlines also
used this system as a forum to exchange information that
was of limited or no use to consumers but was important to
the other airlines in communicating and agreeing upon
supracompetitive fares.
The Division asserted that the defendant airlines essentially signaled their concurrence or disagreement to entreaties
to raise fares and/or eliminate discounted fares through the
First and Last Ticket Dates.43 Essentially, the defendant airlines communicated among themselves relatively costless proposals to change fares through these footnote designators
with First and Last Ticket Dates. They employed sophisticated computer programs to process all this fare information,
which enabled them to monitor and analyze their competitors' responses to current and future fares on certain routes.
These negotiations at times would link fare changes among
different routes, and continue for several weeks until all the
airlines had indicated their commitment to the fare increases by filing the same fares in the same markets with the same
First Ticket Date. Likewise, the airlines used the Last Ticket
Dates in connection with the footnote designators to communicate proposals to eliminate discounted fares currently
being offered to consumers. Not only did this computerized
fare dissemination system enable the defendants to negotiate

supracompetitive fares, it importantly enabled them to verify that such fares would stick, and signal retaliatory measures
against any airline that did not go along with specific fares for
specific routes.44
But while this information exchange greatly facilitated
tacit collusion, the Division noted, it was of little benefit to
consumers. 45 Some defendants disputed this claim, submitting numerous affidavits from travel agents praising the airlines' policy of advanced notice, and arguing that such signaling was employed, as in Ethyl, in geographic markets
where only one airline had market power.46 But the travel
agents did not have access to some of this information (such
as the footnote designators), and thus could not readily determine all of the airlines' contemplated changes to fares. Nor
could the agents (unlike the airlines) readily determine the
relationships between proposed fare increases for certain
routes and the with elimination of discounted fares on other
routes. 47 Moreover, the pricing information, asserted the
Division, was unreliable and misleading, in particular because
the airlines changed the ticket dates often.48
The Division's consent decrees attempted to shift the lever
toward promoting information of use to the consumers. The
decrees did not prohibit the posting of air fare pricing; rather,
the defendants were prohibited from posting fare information
of little significance to the consumer, namely Last Ticket
Dates, with the exception of those used in advertised promotions, and First Ticket Dates.49 Thus, the airline's posted
fares would have some significance for the consumer, as the
travel agents could immediately purchase the ticket that day
for that fare. Likewise, by restricting the airlines from using
Last Ticket Dates except under advertised commitments, the
decrees ended the "costless communication" among the
defendants about which discounts should be removed.5" The
decrees did not eliminate the possibility of tacit coordination.5 Rather, they made such negotiations costlier for the
52
airlines by imposing some risk on the price leader.
Moreover, when one airline recently violated this decree by
signaling a price increase through a prohibited mechanism,
it resulted in a $3 million civil penalty. 3
What Type of Information Is Being Exchanged? It is
often stated that exchanging older price information is less
likely to be anticompetitive than exchanging information on
current or future prices.54 But this distinction should not be
relied on too heavily. Information of completed transactions,
for example, may be of little or no benefit to customers, but
may assist competitors in monitoring, and retaliating against,
any price concessions. The more specific the pricing information, the more likely the competitors can detect cheating.
Thus, as the dissent noted in Blomkest, the fact that the
shared information among competitors involved completed
sales and not future sales does not legitimize it.55
On the other hand, future pricing information may be
quite important to customers in their financial planning.
The fact that it is prospective should not increase its antitrust
risks over completed transactional data that is of little use to

customers. In essence, the line should not be simply drawn
between future and past pricing data. Counsel will instead
want to inquire how this information: (1) benefits customers
and market efficiency and (2) facilitates tacit collusion.
Sharing historical price, supply, or cost data may enhance
efficiency by enabling each competitor to benchmark its performance to an industry standard.56 For such exchanges,
counsel can steer clients to the green safety zone by applying,
to the extent possible, Section 6.A of the Health Care Guidelines,5 7 by having:
" A third party (e.g., a purchaser, government agency,
consultant, academic institution, or trade association)
collect the data,
" The information provided by the participants be based
on data more than three months old,
" At least five providers report data upon which each
disseminated statistic is based, with no individual
provider's data representing more than 25 percent on a
weighted basis of that statistic, and
" Any information disseminated be sufficiently aggregated such that it would not allow recipients to identify the prices charged or compensation paid by any particular provider.58
Competitors should also refrain from discussing the
exchanged information with each other, or from assuring
each other that they will derive their prices from the
exchanged data.
Could Any Lesser Anticompetitive Means Achieve
Comparable Procompetitive Benefits? The antitrust risks
increase if the competitors share more information than customers require or request, or than is required to promote
market efficiency. Can the procompetitive benefits be
achieved through less anticompetitive measures? For example,
is the company
" Directing the communications to the extent feasible to
the customers? If, as in Petroleum Products,59 customers
were individually notified concerning changes in prices
or discount levels, courts may be more suspicious of a
change (public posting of such information) that does
not benefit consumers. Granted a competitor should
not be penalized for employing new, cost-effective
means to announce its prices (such as posting them on
its Web site), if that benefits its customers. But in certain industries customers may easily receive information
of future prices directly.
" Providing as much detail as customers require, and
limiting the amount of extraneous chatter? Customers
may benefit from information about future price
increases, but not necessarily from the client's new "disciplined" approach to restoring "price integrity."
" Announcing future price increases only as far in
advance as customers require? If customers generally
require two-weeks advanced notice, announcing price
increases three months in advance may do little for
customers (except stockpile to the extent feasible) but
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enable multiple attempts by competitors to signal to
each other a mutually acceptable price increase.
What Discernible Anticompetitive Impact Does this
Pricing Exchange Have on the Marketplace? Although this
is the key question, it is often a hard one to answer. In an oligopoly, one is likely to see interdependent pricing. Moreover,
parallel pricing is ambiguous, as both competitive and concentrated markets may evidence it.
More informative perhaps are natural experiments, such
as pricing behavior during periods when such information
was not exchanged. Justice Fortas, in his concurrence in
ContainerCorp.,0 noted that in some instances when various
defendants ceased exchanging pricing information, exceptionally sharp and vigorous price reductions resulted.
Even if a natural experiment reveals that the competitors'
prices shifted, that alone may be insufficient to find liability. When customers and competitors struggle in the darkness
of limited price transparency, prices may be dispersed; after
greater transparency, individual competitors' prices may shift
either upward or downward. For example, some Internet
retailers may reduce or increase their price for a particular
table saw after determining their competitors' prices on
Froogle. This may not necessarily harm competition,
particularly if the average price level does not increase. As
Justice Holmes noted in his dissent in American Column &
Lumber,61 a combination to distribute knowledge, notwithstanding its tendency to equalize, not necessarily raise prices,
is not an unreasonable restraint of trade. On the other hand,
if after the exchange of commercially sensitive information,
the average retail price level increases significantly or stabilizes (despite an increase in capacity or decrease in the price

of a significant cost input), this would invite closer antitrust
scrutiny.
Are the Client and Its Competitors Undertaking Any
Additional Overt Actions, from Which One May Infer a Per
Se Illegal Price-Fixing Scheme? This article focuses on the
antitrust risks of information exchanges. But the antitrust risk
may depend on other "plus" factors. This final question
avoids the trap, as Judge Posner warned in In re High Fructose
Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig.,62 of supposing that if no single
item of evidence presented by the plaintiff points unequivocally to conspiracy, then the evidence as a whole cannot
defeat summary judgment. Thus, in assessing the antitrust
risks, counsel should not wipe the slate clean after examining
the exchange of commercially sensitive information. Rather,
counsel may wish to tally this risk in the context of the
antitrust risks flowing from the client's other actions.

1 For a global perspective, see OECD's Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and
Enterprise Affairs, Committee on Competition Law & Policy, Competition
Policy Roundtable: Price Transparency (Sept. 11, 2001), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/63/2535975.pdf [hereinafter OECD
DAFFE/CLP (2001) 22]. Price transparency refers to the costs in time and
money to discover actual transaction prices: the lower the costs, the more
transparent the market. Id. at 9.
2 Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 598 (1936).

5 275 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2001), transferred, upon remand, by 206 F.Supp.

3 United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978);
see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 160 (2d ed. 2001) (generally,
the more information sellers have about their competitors' prices and output, the more efficiently the market will operate).
4 See, e.g., Press Release, Federal Trade Comm'n, Virginia Board of Funeral
Directors & Embalmers, FTC 041-0014 (Aug. 16, 2004), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/08/vafuneral.htm (board's prohibition on
licensed funeral directors advertising discounts deprived consumers of
truthful information); Press Release, Federal Trade Comm'n, Arizona Automobile Dealers Association, FTC C-3497 (Feb. 25, 1994), available at 1994
WL 184107 (trade association illegally agreed with members to restrict
nondeceptive comparative and discount advertising and advertisements
concerning the terms and availability of consumer credit); OECD DAFFE/CLP
(2001) 22, supra note 1, at 183, 185-86 (citing examples of U.S. enforcement agencies seeking to increase price transparency); but see InterVest, Inc.
v. Bloomberg, L.P., 340 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2003) (lack of price transparency
in bond market not illegal if consistent with unilateral conduct).

Conclusion
There is no bright-line rule for when increased price transparency would violate the antitrust laws. Nor can there be
one, given the fact-intensive inquiry and the varying likelihood of pro- and anticompetitive effects. But in assessing
the antitrust risk level arising from the dissemination of competitively sensitive information, the focus should be primarily on the information's value to the customers and in promoting overall market efficiency, and next, on the likelihood
that sharing such information would promote tacit collusion.
It is important to understand whether, and to what degree,
consumers are likely to benefit from the information's disclosure. If not, there is a substantial risk that the information
is being disclosed for anticompetitive reasons.0

6

2d 1374 (J.P.M.L. 2002).
See, e.g., Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 483-84
(1stCir. 1988); ROBERT
431 (2d ed. 1992).

S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS

509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993).
8 If competitors react more quickly than a sufficient number of buyers, the dis'

counter, as a result, will not increase its sales at its competitors' expense.
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